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Do we have a legally binding contract? 
 
Legal advisers are often called upon to advise whether informal correspondence 
between clients may give rise to a binding contract.  The decision of Mullins J in 
Teviot Downs Estate Pty Ltd v MTAA Superannuation Fund (Flagstone Creek 
and Spring Mountain Park) Property Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 403 provides general 
guidance as to matters that may be relevant when faced with this thorny issue. 
 
Facts 
 
An order for specific performance was sought against the respondent, as vendor, 
in respect of an agreement for the sale of land alleged to be contained in or 
evidenced by writing.  The putative purchaser offered to purchase certain en 
globo land on terms set out in a letter dated 22 August 2003 to the owner.  On 25 
August, a draft contract of sale (in REIQ format) was submitted to the respondent 
owner. 
 
On 29 August 2003, after various discussions between the parties, a facsimile 
transmission was sent by the owner to the putative purchaser the relevant parts 
of which were: 
 
‘…I write now to confirm that the MTAA Superannuation Fund has considered 
your letter of 22 August… In the result the Trustee has agreed to accept your 
offer of $11 million plus GST on the terms that you have proposed.’ 
 
After further correspondence and discussions, by letter dated 3 October 2003 the 
owner’s solicitor advised that their client did not approve the proposed sale of the 
land. 
 
Issue 
 
The main issue was whether a legally binding contract came into effect on 29 
August 2003 when the putative purchaser received the facsimile of that date from 
the owner. 
 
Relevant law 
 
Justice Mullins referred to the well know formulation in Masters v Cameron 
(1954) 91 CLR 353, 360: 
 
‘Where parties who have been in negotiation reach agreement upon terms of a 
contractual nature and also agree that the matter of their negotiation shall be 
dealt with by a formal contract, the case may belong to any one of three classes.  
It may be one in which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms 
of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those 
terms, but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which 
will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect.  Or, secondly, it may be a 
case in which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of their 
bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that upon which their agreed 
terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more 
of the terms conditional upon the execution of a formal document.  Or, thirdly, the 
case may be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded 
bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract.’ 
 
In addition to these three classes of case, a fourth class of case was recognized 
in Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310, 317: 
 
‘… one in which the parties were content to be bound immediately and 
exclusively by the terms they had agreed upon whilst expecting to make a further 
contract in substitution for the first contract, containing, by consent, additional 
terms.’ 
 
To determine which of the four classes the agreement between the parties fell 
into, Mullins J noted that the discerning feature was whether the parties intended 
to be legally bound by the agreement.  This decisive issue, the intention of the 
parties, was to be objectively ascertained from the terms of the document when 
read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.  Justice Mullins also noted 
that the relevance of the nature of the subject matter of the agreement was also 
emphasised in Marek v Australasian Conference Assn Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 
521, 527-528. 
 
Decision 
 
For the putative purchaser it was submitted that the acceptance by the owner of 
the offer made fell either within the second class identified in Masters v Cameron 
or the so called fourth class.  Unfortunately for the applicant this submission was 
rejected with Mullins J holding that a legally binding contract was not established 
by the relevant exchange of correspondence; in effect, the third class identified in 
Masters v Cameron. 
 
Although there were matters in favour of finding that a binding agreement had 
been reached, including the symmetry between the offer made on 22 August and 
the acceptance on 29 August, Mullins J opined that it was not likely when the 
proposed transaction was for no less than $11m that the parties intended to 
become bound by the facsimile transmission of 29 August subject to that 
agreement being replaced by a formal contract when the terms were resolved.  
The exchange of correspondence had to be viewed in the context of being a 
significant transaction. 
 
As well as the size and nature of the transaction, there were other indicia that the 
parties did not intend to be legally bound upon the sending of the facsimile 
transmission of 29 August 2003.  Key indicia included: 
 
 The lack of identification of ancillary property to be sold with the land; 
 
 It was contemplated that signing of the draft contract, submitted on behalf 
of the putative purchaser, would be the method of acceptance of the offer; 
 
 The submission of the draft contract on 25 August was described as ‘a 
token of the preparedness to be bound to purchase’.  This description was 
unnecessary if the earlier offer was intended to be capable of producing a 
binding contract upon acceptance; 
 
 The eagerness with which the putative purchaser sought to have a formal 
contract signed; and 
 
 The extent of the matters to be covered in the formal contract document 
 
As recognized expressly in the judgment, the decisive issue when determining if 
a legally binding contract has been formed is the intention of the parties.  As the 
parties’ intention must be objectively ascertained, from the terms of the individual 
document when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, each decision 
will largely be unique.  That said, it is worth mentioning the instructive caution 
issued by McHugh JA (as he then was) (with whom the other members of the 
court agreed) in GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkam Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd 
(1986) 40 NSWLR 631, 634: 
 
‘An agreement for the sale of property at a specified price does not necessarily 
indicate a legally binding contract.’ 
 
Although the intention of the parties, as objectively ascertained, will always be 
paramount, this decision clearly illustrates that circumstances will arise where the 
magnitude, subject matter or complexities of the transaction may militate against 
a finding that an agreement was intended to have legal effect. 
